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ABSTRACT
Many deployed learned models are black boxes: given input, returns output. Inter-
nal information about the model, such as the architecture, optimisation procedure,
or training data, is not disclosed explicitly as it might contain proprietary infor-
mation or make the system more vulnerable. This work shows that such attributes
of neural networks can be exposed from a sequence of queries. This has multiple
implications. On the one hand, our work exposes the vulnerability of black-box
neural networks to different types of attacks – we show that the revealed internal
information helps generate more effective adversarial examples against the black
box model. On the other hand, this technique can be used for better protection
of private content from automatic recognition models using adversarial examples.
Our paper suggests that it is actually hard to draw a line between white box and
black box models. The code is available at goo.gl/MbYfsv.
1 INTRODUCTION
Black-box models take a sequence of query inputs, and return corresponding outputs, while keeping
internal states such as model architecture hidden. They are deployed as black boxes usually on
purpose – for protecting intellectual properties or privacy-sensitive training data. Our work aims at
inferring information about the internals of black box models – ultimately turning them into white
box models. Such a reverse-engineering of a black box model has many implications. On the one
hand, it has legal implications to intellectual properties (IP) involving neural networks – internal
information about the model can be proprietary and a key IP, and the training data may be privacy
sensitive. Disclosing hidden details may also render the model more susceptible to attacks from
adversaries. On the other hand, gaining information about a black-box model can be useful in other
scenarios. E.g. there has been work on utilising adversarial examples for protecting private regions
(e.g. faces) in photographs from automatic recognisers (Oh et al., 2017). In such scenarios, gaining
more knowledge on the recognisers will increase the chance of protecting one’s privacy. Either way,
it is a crucial research topic to investigate the type and amount of information that can be gained
from a black-box access to a model. We make a first step towards understanding the connection
between white box and black box approaches – which were previously thought of as distinct classes.
We introduce the term “model attributes” to refer to various types of information about a trained
neural network model. We group them into three types: (1) architecture (e.g. type of non-linear acti-
vation), (2) optimisation process (e.g. SGD or ADAM?), and (3) training data (e.g. which dataset?).
We approach the problem as a standard supervised learning task applied over models. First, collect
a diverse set of white-box models (“meta-training set”) that are expected to be similar to the tar-
get black box at least to a certain extent. Then, over the collected meta-training set, train another
model (“metamodel”) that takes a model as input and returns the corresponding model attributes as
output. Importantly, since we want to predict attributes at test time for black-box models, the only
information available for attribute prediction is the query input-output pairs. As we will see in the
experiments, such input-output pairs allow to predict model attributes surprisingly well.
In summary, we contribute: (1) Investigation of the type and amount of internal information about
the black-box model that can be extracted from querying; (2) Novel metamodel methods that not
only reason over outputs from static query inputs, but also actively optimise query inputs that can
extract more information; (3) Study of factors like size of the meta-training set, quantity and quality
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of queries, and the dissimilarity between the meta-training models and the test black box (gener-
alisability); (4) Empirical verification that revealed information leads to greater susceptibility of a
black-box model to an adversarial example based attack.
2 RELATED WORK
There has been a line of work on extracting and exploiting information from black-box learned mod-
els. We first describe papers on extracting information (model extraction and membership inference
attacks), and then discuss ones on attacking the network using the extracted information (adversarial
image perturbations (AIP)).
Model extraction attacks either reconstruct the exact model parameters or build an avatar model that
maximises the likelihood of the query input-output pairs from the target model (Tramer et al., 2016;
Papernot et al., 2017). Tramer et al. (2016) have shown the efficacy of equation solving attacks and
the avatar method in retrieving internal parameters of non-neural network models. Papernot et al.
(2017) have also used the avatar approach with the end goal of generating adversarial examples.
While the avatar approach first assumes model hyperparameters like model family (architecture) and
training data, we discriminatively train a metamodel to predict those hyperparameters themselves.
As such, our approach is complementary to the avatar approach.
Membership inference attacks determine if a given data sample has been included in the training
data (Ateniese et al., 2015; Shokri et al., 2017). In particular, Ateniese et al. (2015) also trains a
decision tree metamodel over a set of classifiers trained on different datasets. This work goes far
beyond only inferring the training data by showing that even the model architecture and optimisation
process can be inferred.
Using the obtained cues, one can launch more effective, focused attacks on the black box. We use
adversarial image perturbations (AIPs) as an example of such attack. AIPs are small perturbations
over the input such that the network is mislead. Research on this topic has flourished recently after
it was shown that the needed amount of perturbation to completely mislead an image classifier is
nearly invisible (Szegedy et al., 2014; Goodfellow et al., 2015; Moosavi-Dezfooli et al., 2017).
Most effective AIPs require gradients of the target network. Some papers proposed different ways
to attack black boxes. They can be grouped into three approaches. (1) Approximate gradients by
numerical gradients (Narodytska & Kasiviswanathan, 2017; Chen et al., 2017). The caveat is that
thousands and millions of queries are needed to compute a single AIP, depending on the image
size. (2) Use the avatar approach to train a white box network that is supposedly similar to the
target (Papernot et al., 2016b;a; Hayes & Danezis, 2017). We note again that our metamodel is
complementary to the avatar approach – the avatar network hyperparemters can be determined by
the metamodel. (3) Exploit transferability of adversarial examples; it has been shown that AIPs
generated against one network can also fool other networks (Moosavi-Dezfooli et al., 2017; Liu
et al., 2017). Liu et al. (2017) in particular have shown that generating AIPs against an ensemble of
networks make it more transferable. We show in this work that the AIPs transfer better within an
architecture family (e.g. ResNet or DenseNet) than across, and that such a property can be exploited
by our metamodel for generating more targetted AIPs.
3 METAMODELS
 
Figure 1: Overview of our approach.
We want to find out the type and amount of in-
ternal information about a black-box model that
can be revealed from a sequence of queries. We
approach this by first building metamodels for
predicting model attributes, and then evaluating
their performance on black-box models. Our
main approach, metamodel, is described in figure 1. In a nutshell, the metamodel is a classifier of
classifiers. Specifically, The metamodel submits n query inputs
[
xi
]n
i=1
to a black box model f ; the
metamodel takes corresponding model outputs
[
f(xi)
]n
i=1
as an input, and returns predicted model
attributes as output. As we will describe in detail, the metamodel not only learns to infer model
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attributes from query outputs from a static set of inputs, but also searches for query inputs that are
designed to extract greater amount of information from the target models.
In this section, our main methods are introduced in the context of MNIST digit classifiers. While
MNIST classifiers are not fully representative of generic learned models, they have a computational
edge: it takes only five minutes to train each of them with reasonable performance. We could
thus prepare a diverse set of 11k MNIST classifiers within 40 GPU days for the meta-training and
evaluation of our metamodels. We stress, however, that the proposed approach is generic with
respect to the task, data, and the type of models. We also focus on 12 model attributes (table 1)
that cover hyperparameters for common neural network MNIST classifiers, but again the range of
predictable attributes are not confined to this list.
3.1 COLLECTING A DATASET OF CLASSIFIERS
We need a dataset of classifiers to train and evaluate metamodels. We explain how MNIST-NETS
has been constructed, a dataset of 11k MNIST digit classifiers; the procedure is task and data generic.
BASE NETWORK SKELETON
Every model in MNIST-NETS shares the same convnet skeleton architecture: “N conv blocks →
M fc blocks → 1 linear classifier”. Each conv block has the following structure: “ks ×
ks convolution → optional 2 × 2 max-pooling → non-linear activation”, where ks (kernel size)
and the activation type are to be chosen. Each fc block has the structure: “′′linear mapping →
non-linear activation → optional dropout” This convnet structure already covers many LeNet (Le-
Cun et al., 1998) variants, one of the best performing architectures on MNIST1.
INCREASING DIVERSITY Table 1: MNIST classifier attributes. Italicised attributes are
derived from other attributes.
Code Attribute Values
A
rc
hi
te
ct
ur
e
act Activation ReLU, PReLU, ELU, Tanh
drop Dropout Yes, No
pool Max pooling Yes, No
ks Conv ker. size 3, 5
#conv #Conv layers 2, 3, 4
#fc #FC layers 2, 3, 4
#par #Parameters 214, · · · , 221
ens Ensemble Yes, No
O
pt
. alg Algorithm SGD, ADAM, RMSprop
bs Batch size 64, 128, 256
D
at
a split Data split All0, Half0/1, Quarter0/1/2/3
size Data size All, Half, Quarter
In order to learn generalisable fea-
tures, the metamodel needs to be
trained over a diverse set of mod-
els. The base architecture described
above already has several free param-
eters like the number of layers (N and
M ), the existence of dropout or max-
pooling layers, or the type of non-
linear activation.
Apart from the architectural hyperpa-
rameters, we increase diversity along
two more axes – optimisation pro-
cess and the training data. Along
the optimisation axis, we vary opti-
misation algorithm (SGD, ADAM, or
RMSprop) and the training batch size (64, 128, 256). We also consider training MNIST classifiers
on either on the entire MNIST training set (All0, 60k), one of the two disjoint halves (Half0/1, 30k),
or one of the four disjoint quarters (Quarter0/1/2/3, 15k).
See table 1 for the comprehensive list of 12 model attributes altered in MNIST-NETS. The number
of trainable parameters (#par) and the training data size (size) are not directly controlled but derived
from the other attributes. We also augment MNIST-NETSwith ensembles of classifiers (ens), whose
procedure will be described later.
SAMPLING AND TRAINING
The number of all possible combinations of controllable options in table 1 is 18, 144. We also select
random seeds that control the initialisation and training data shuffling from {0, · · · , 999}, resulting
in 18, 144, 000 unique models. Training such a large number of models is intractable; we have
sampled (without replacement) and trained 10, 000 of them. All the models have been trained with
1http://yann.lecun.com/exdb/mnist/
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learning rate 0.1 and momentum 0.5 for 100 epochs. It takes around 5 minutes to train each model
on a GPU machine (GeForce GTX TITAN); training of 10k classifiers has taken 40 GPU days.
PRUNING AND AUGMENTING
In order to make sure that MNIST-NETS realistically represents commonly used MNIST classifiers,
we have pruned low-performance classifiers (validation accuracy< 98%), resulting in 8, 582 clas-
sifiers. Ensembles of trained classifiers have been constructed by grouping the identical classifiers
(modulo random seed). Given t identical ones, we have augmented MNIST-NETS with 2, · · · , t
combinations. The ensemble augmentation has resulted in 11, 282 final models. See appendix table
6 for statistics of attributes – due to large sample size all the attributes are evenly covered.
TRAIN-EVAL SPLITS
Attribute prediction can get arbitrarily easy by including the black-box model (or similar ones) in
the meta-training set. We introduce multiple splits of MNIST-NETS with varying requirements on
generalization. Unless stated otherwise, every split has 5, 000 training (meta-training), 1, 000 testing
(black box), and 5, 282 leftover models.
The Random (R) split randomly (uniform weights) assigns training and test splits, respectively.
Under the R split, the training and test models come from the same distribution. We introduce harder
Extrapolation (E) splits. We separate a few attributes between the training and test splits. They are
designed to simulate more difficult domain gaps when the meta-training models are significantly
different from the black box. Specific examples of E splits will be shown in §4.
3.2 METAMODEL METHODS
The metamodel predicts the attribute of a black-box model g in the test split by submitting n query
inputs and observing the outputs. It is trained over meta-training models f in the training split
(f ∼ F). We propose three approaches for the metamodels – we collectively name them kennen2.
See figure 2 for an overview.
KENNEN-O : REASON OVER OUTPUT
 
Figure 2: Training procedure for metamodels
kennen-o (top) and kennen-i (bottom).
kennen-o first selects a fixed set of queries
[xi]i=1···n from a dataset. Both during training
and testing, always these queries are submitted.
kennen-o learns a classifier mθ to map from
the order-sensitively concatenated n query out-
puts, [f(xi)]i=1···n (n×10 dim for MNIST), to
the simultaneous prediction of 12 attributes in
f . The training objective is:
min
θ
E
f∼F
[
12∑
a=1
L (maθ ([f(xi)]ni=1) , ya)
]
(1)
where F is the distribution of meta-training
models, ya is the ground truth label of attribute
a, and L is the cross-entropy loss. With the
learned parameter θ˜, ma
θ˜
(
[g(xi)]ni=1
)
gives the
prediction of attribute a for the black box g.
In our experiments, we model the classifier mθ via multilayer perceptron (MLP) with two hidden
layers with 1000 hidden units. The last layer consists of 12 parallel linear layers for a simultaneous
prediction of the attributes. In our preliminary experiments, MLP has performed better than the
linear classifiers. The optimisation problem in equation 1 is solved via SGD by approximating the
expectation over f ∼ F by an empirical sum over the training split classifiers for 200 epochs.
2kennen means “to know” in German, and “to dig out” in Korean.
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For query inputs, we have used a random subset of n images from the validation set (both for MNIST
and ImageNet experiments). The performance is not sensitive to the choice of queries (see appendix
§C). Next methods (kennen-i/io) describe how to actively craft query inputs, potentially outside
the natural image distribution.
Note that kennen-o can be applied to any type of model (e.g. non-neural networks) with any
output structure, as long as the output can be embedded in an Euclidean space. We will show that
this method can effectively extract information from f even if the output is a top-k ranking.
KENNEN-I : CRAFT INPUT
kennen-i crafts a single query input x˜ over the meta-training models that is trained to repurpose
a digit classifier f into a model attribute classifier for a single attribute a. The crafted input drives
the classifier to leak internal information via digit prediction. The learned input is submitted to the
test black-box model g, and the attribute is predicted by reading off its digit prediction g(x˜). For
example, kennen-i for max-pooling layer prediction crafts an input x that is predicted as “1” for
generic MNIST digit classifiers with max-pooling layers and “0” for ones without. See figure 3 for
visual examples.
drop pool ks
77.0% 94.8% 88.5%
Figure 3: Inputs designed to extract internal de-
tails from MNIST digit classifiers. E.g. feeding
the middle image reveals the existence of a max-
pooling layer with 94.8% chance.
We describe in detail how kennen-i learns
this input. The training objective is:
min
x: image
E
f∼F
[L (f(x), ya)] (2)
where f(x) is the 10-dimensional output of the
digit classifier f . The condition x : image en-
sures the input stays a valid image x ∈ [0, 1]D
with image dimension D. The loss L, together
with the attribute label ya of f , guides the digit
prediction f(x) to reveal the attribute a instead.
Note that the optimisation problem is identical
to the training of digit classifiers except that the ground truth is the attribute label rather than the digit
label, that the loss is averaged over the models instead of the images, and that the input x instead
of the model f is optimised. With the learned query input x˜, the attribute for the black box g is
predicted by g(x˜). In particular, we do not use gradient information from g.
We initialise x with a random sample from the MNIST validation set (random noise or uniform
gray initialisation gives similar performances), and run SGD for 200 epochs. For each iteration x is
truncated back to [0, 1]D to enforce the constraint.
While being simple and effective, kennen-i can only predict a single attribute at a time, and
cannot predict attributes with more than 10 classes (for digit classifiers). kennen-io introduced
below overcomes these limitations. kennen-i may also be unrealistic when the exploration needs
to be stealthy: it submits unnatural images to the system. Also unlike kennen-o, kennen-i
requires end-to-end differentiability of the training models f ∼ F , although it still requires only
black-box access to test models g.
KENNEN-IO : COMBINED APPROACH
We overcome the drawbacks of kennen-i that it can only predict one attribute at a time and that
the number of predictable classes by attaching an additional interpretation module on top of the
output. Our final method kennen-io combines kennen-i and kennen-o approaches: both
input generator and output interpreters are used. Being able to reason over multiple query outputs
via MLP layers, kennen-io supports the optimisation of multiple query inputs as well.
Specifically, the kennen-io training objective is given by:
min
[xi]ni=1: images
min
θ
E
f∼F
[
12∑
a=1
L (maθ ([f(xi)]ni=1) , ya)
]
. (3)
Note that the formulation is identical to that for kennen-o (equation 1), except that the second
minimisation problem regarding the query inputs is added. With learned parameters θ˜ and [x˜i]ni=1,
5
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Table 2: Comparison of metamodel methods. See table 1 for the full names of attributes. 100
queries are used for every method below, except for kennen-i which uses a single query. The
“Output” column shows the output representation: “prob” (vector of probabilities for each digit
class), “ranking” (a sorted list of digits according to their likelihood), “top-1” (most likely digit), or
“bottom-1” (least likely digit).
architecture optim data
Method Output act drop pool ks #conv #fc #par ens alg bs size split avg
Chance - 25.0 50.0 50.0 50.0 33.3 33.3 12.5 50.0 33.3 33.3 33.3 14.3 34.9
kennen-o prob 80.6 94.6 94.9 84.6 67.1 77.3 41.7 54.0 71.8 50.4 73.8 90.0 73.4
kennen-o ranking 63.7 93.8 90.8 80.0 63.0 73.7 44.1 62.4 65.3 47.0 66.2 86.6 69.7
kennen-o bottom-1 48.6 80.0 73.6 64.0 48.9 63.1 28.7 52.8 53.6 41.9 45.9 51.4 54.4
kennen-o top-1 31.2 56.9 58.8 49.9 38.9 33.7 19.6 50.0 36.1 35.3 33.3 30.7 39.5
kennen-i top-1 43.5 77.0 94.8 88.5 54.5 41.0 32.3 46.5 45.7 37.0 42.6 29.3 52.7
kennen-io score 88.4 95.8 99.5 97.7 80.3 80.2 45.2 60.2 79.3 54.3 84.8 95.6 80.1
the attribute a for the black box g is predicted by ma
θ˜
(
[g(x˜i)]ni=1
)
. Again, we require end-to-end
differentiability of meta-training models f , but only the black-box access for the test model g.
To improve stability against covariate shift, we initialise mθ with kennen-o for 200 epochs. Af-
terwards, gradient updates of [xi]ni=1 and θ alternate every 50 epochs, for 200 additional epochs.
4 REVERSE-ENGINEERING BLACK-BOX MNIST DIGIT CLASSIFIERS
We have introduced a procedure for constructing a dataset of classifiers (MNIST-NETS) as well as
novel metamodels (kennen variants) that learn to extract information from black-box classifiers.
In this section, we evaluate the ability of kennen to extract information from black-box MNIST
digit classifiers. We measure the class-balanced attribute prediction accuracy for each attribute a in
the list of 12 attributes in table 1.
ATTRIBUTE PREDICTION
See table 2 for the main results of our metamodels, kennen-o/i/io, on the Random split. Unless
stated otherwise, metamodels are trained with 5, 000 training split classifiers.
Given n = 100 queries with probability output, kennen-o already performs far above the random
chance in predicting 12 diverse attributes (73.4% versus 34.9% on average); neural network output
indeed contains rich information about the black box. In particular, the presence of dropout (94.6%)
or max-pooling (94.9%) has been predicted with high precision. As we will see in §4.3, outputs of
networks trained with dropout layers form clusters, explaining the good prediction performance.
It is surprising that optimisation details like algorithm (71.8%) and batch size (50.4%) can also
be predicted well above the random chance (33.3% for both). We observe that the training data
attributes are also predicted with high accuracy (71.8% and 90.0% for size and split).
COMPARING METHODS KENNEN-O/I/IO
Table 2 shows the comparison of kennen-o/i/io. kennen-i has a relatively low performance
(average 52.7%), but kennen-i relies on a cheap resource: 1 query with single-label output.
kennen-i is also performant at predicting the kernel size (88.5%) and pooling (94.8%), attributes
that are closely linked to spatial structure of the input. We conjecture kennen-i is relatively effec-
tive for such attributes. kennen-io is superior to kennen-o/i for all the attributes with average
accuracy 80.1%.
4.1 FACTOR ANALYSIS
We examine potential factors that contribute to the successful prediction of black box internal at-
tributes. We measure the prediction accuracy of our metamodels as we vary (1) the number of
meta-training models, (2) the number of queries, and (3) the quality of query output.
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Figure 4: kennen-o performance of against the size of meta-training set (left), number of queries
(middle), and quality of queries (right). Unless stated otherwise, we use 100 probability outputs and
5k models to train kennen-o. Each curve is linearly scaled such that random chance (0 training
data, 0 query, or top-0) performs 0%, and the perfect predictor performs 100%.
NUMBER OF TRAINING MODELS
We have trained kennen-o with different number of the meta-training classifiers, ranging from
100 to 5, 000. See figure 4 (left) for the trend. We observe a diminishing return, but also that the
performance has not saturated – collecting larger meta-training set will improve the performance.
NUMBER OF QUERIES
See figure 4 (middle) for the kennen-o performance against the number of queries with probability
output. The average performance saturates after ∼ 500 queries. On the other hand, with only ∼ 100
queries, we already retrieve ample information about the neural network.
QUALITY OF OUTPUT
Many black-box models return top-k ranking (e.g. Facebook face recogniser), or single-label output.
We represent top-k ranking outputs by assigning exponentially decaying probabilities up to k digits
and a small probability  to the remaining.
See table 2 for the kennen-o performance comparison among 100 probability, top-10 ranking,
bottom-1, and top-1 outputs, with average accuracies 73.4%, 69.7%, 54.4%, and 39.5%, respec-
tively. While performance drops with coarser outputs, when compared to random chance (34.9%),
100 single-label bottom-1 outputs already leak a great amount of information about the black box
(54.4%). It is also notable that bottom-1 outputs contain much more information than do the top-
1 outputs; note that for high-performance classifiers top-1 predictions are rather uniform across
models and thus have much less freedom to leak auxiliary information. Figure 4 (right) shows the
interpolation from top-1 to top-10 (i.e. top-9) ranking. We observe from the jump at k = 2 that the
second likely predictions (top-2) contain far more information than the most likely ones (top-1). For
k ≥ 3, each additional output label exhibits a diminishing return.
4.2 WHAT IF THE BLACK-BOX IS QUITE DIFFERENT FROM META-TRAINING MODELS?
So far we have seen results on the Random (R) split. In realistic scenarios, the meta-training model
distribution may not be fully covering possible black box models. We show how damaging such a
scenario is through Extrapolation (E) split experiments.
EVALUATION
E-splits split the training and testing models based on one or more attributes (§3.1). For example,
we may assign shallower models (#layers ≤ 10) to the training split and deeper ones (#layers ¿10)
to the testing split. In this example, we refer to #layers as the splitting attribute. Since for an E-split,
some classes of the splitting attributes have zero training examples, we only evaluate the prediction
accuracies over the non-splitting attributes. When the set of splitting attributes is A˜, a subset of the
entire attribute set A, we define E-split accuracy or E.Acc(A˜) to be the mean prediction accuracy
over the non-splitting attributes A \ A˜. For easier comparison, we report the normalised accuracy
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(N.Acc) that shows the how much percentage of the R-split accuracy is achieved in the E-split setup
on the non-splitting attributes A \ A˜. Specifically:
N.Acc(A˜) =
E.Acc(A˜)− Chance(A˜)
R.Acc(A˜)− Chance(A˜) × 100% (4)
where R.Acc(A˜) and Chance(A˜) are the means of the R-split and Chance-level accuracies over
A \ A˜. Note that N.Acc is 100% if the E-split performance is at the level of R-split and 0% if it is at
chance level.
RESULTS
Table 3: Normalised accuracies (see text) of
kennen-o and kennen-io on R and E splits.
We denote E-split with splitting attributes attr1
and attr2 as “E-attr1-attr2”. Splitting criteria are
also shown. When there are two splitting at-
tributes, the first attribute inherits the previous row
criteria.
kennen-
Split Train Test o io
R - - 100 100
E-#conv 2,3 4 87.5 92.0
E-#conv-#fc 2,3 4 77.1 80.7
E-alg SGD,ADAM RMSprop 83.0 88.5
E-alg-bs 64,128 256 64.2 70.0
E-split Quarter0/1 Quarter2/3 83.5 89.3
E-size Quarter Half,All 81.7 86.8
Chance - - 0.0 0.0
The normalised accuracies for R-split and mul-
tiple E-splits are presented in table 3. We con-
sider three axes of choices of splitting attributes
for the E-split: architecture (#conv and #fc), op-
timisation (alg and bs), and data (size). For
example, “E-#conv-#fc” row presents results
when metamodel is trained on shallower nets
(2 or 3 conv/fc layers each) compared to the test
black box model (4 conv and fc layers each).
Not surprisingly, E-split performances are
lower than R-split ones (N.Acc < 100%); it is
advisable to cover all the expected black-box
attributes during meta-training. Nonetheless,
E-split performances of kennen-io are still
far above the chance level (N.Acc ≥ 70% 
0%); failing to cover a few attributes during
meta-training is not too damaging.
Comparing kennen-o and kennen-io for their generalisability, we observe that kennen-io
consistently outperforms kennen-o under severe extrapolation (around 5 pp better N.Acc). It
is left as a future work to investigate the intriguing fact that utilising out-of-domain query inputs
improves the generalisation of metamodel.
4.3 WHY AND HOW DOES METAMODEL WORK?
It is surprising that metamodels can extract inner details with great precision and generalisability.
This section provides a glimpse of why and how this is possible via metamodel input and output
analyses. Full answers to those questions is beyond the scope of the paper.
METAMODEL INPUT (T-SNE)
We analyse the inputs to our metamodels (i.e. query outputs from black-box models) to convince
ourselves that the inputs do contain discriminative features for model attributes. As the input is high
dimensional (1000 when the number of queries is n = 100), we use the t-SNE (van der Maaten &
Hinton, Nov 2008) visualisation method. Roughly speaking, t-SNE embeds high dimensional data
points onto the 2-dimensional plane such that the pairwise distances are best respected. We then
colour-code the embedded data points according to the model attributes. Clusters of same-coloured
points indicate highly discriminative features.
The visualisation of input data points are shown in Appendix figures 9 and 10 for kennen-o and
kennen-io, respectively. For experimental details, see Appendix §D. In the case of kennen-o,
we observe that some attributes form clear clusters in the input space – e.g. Tanh in act, binary
dropout attribute, and RMSprop in alg. For the other attributes, however, it seems that the clusters
are too complicated to be represented in a 2-dimensional space. For kennen-io (figure 10), we
observe improved clusters for pool and ks. By submitting crafted query inputs, kennen-io induces
query outputs to be better clustered, increasing the chance of successful prediction.
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METAMODEL OUTPUT (CONFUSION MATRIX)
We show confusion matrices of kennen-o/io to analyse the failure modes. See Appendix figures
11 and 12. For kennen-o and kennen-io alike, we observe that the confusion occurs more
frequently with similar classes. For attributes #conv and #fc, more confusion occurs between (2, 3)
or (3, 4) than between (2, 4). A similar trend is observed for #par and bs. This is a strong indication
that (1) there exists semantic attribute information in the neural network outputs (e.g. number of
layers, parameters, or size of training batch) and (2) the metamodels learn semantic information that
can generalise, as opposed to merely relying on artifacts. This observation agrees with a conclusion
of the extrapolation experiments in §4.2: the metamodels generalise.
Compared to those of kennen-o, kennen-io confusion matrices exhibit greater concentration
of masses both on the correct class (diagonals) and among similar attribute classes (1-off diagonals
for #conv, #fc, #par, bs, and size). The former re-confirms the greater accuracy, while the latter
indicates the improved ability to extract more semantic and generalisable features from the query
outputs. This, again, agrees with §4.2: kennen-io generalises better than kennen-o.
4.4 DISCUSSION
We have verified through our novel kennen metamodels that black-box access to a neural net-
work exposes much internal information. We have shown that only 100 single-label outputs already
reveals a great deal about a black box. When the black-box classifier is quite different from the meta-
training classifiers, the performance of our best metamodel – kennen-io– decreases; however, the
prediction accuracy for black box internal information is still surprisingly high.
5 REVERSE-ENGINEERING AND ATTACKING IMAGENET CLASSIFIERS
While MNIST experiments are computationally cheap and a massive number of controlled experi-
ments is possible, we provide additional ImageNet experiments for practical implications on realistic
image classifiers. In this section, we use kennen-o introduced in §3 to predict a single attribute of
black-box ImageNet classifiers – the architecture family (e.g. ResNet or VGG?). In this section, we
go a step further to use the extracted information to attack black boxes with adversarial examples.
5.1 DATASET OF IMAGENET CLASSIFIERS
It is computationally prohibitive to trainO(10k) ImageNet classifiers from scratch as in the previous
section. We have resorted to 19 PyTorch3 pretrained ImageNet classifiers. The 19 classifiers come
from five families: Squeezenet, VGG, VGG-BatchNorm, ResNet, and DenseNet, each with 2, 4, 4,
5, and 4 variants, respectively (Iandola et al., 2016; Simonyan & Zisserman, 2015; Ioffe & Szegedy,
2015; He et al., 2016; Huang et al., 2017). See Appendix table 7 for the the summary of the 19
classifiers. We observe both large intra-family diversity and small inter-family separability in terms
of #layers, #parameters, and performances. The family prediction task is not as trivial as e.g. simply
inferring the performance.
5.2 CLASSIFIER FAMILY PREDICTION
We predict the classifier family (S, V, B, R, D) from the black-box query output, using the method
kennen-o, with the same MLP architecture (§3). kennen-i and kennen-io have not been
used for computational reasons, but can also be used in principle. We conduct 10 cross validations
(random sampling of single test network from each family) for evaluation. We also perform 10 ran-
dom sampling of the queries from ImageNet validation set. In total 100 random tries are averaged.
Results: compared to the random chance (20.0%), 100 queries result in high kennen-o perfor-
mance (90.4%). With 1, 000 queries, the prediction performance is even 94.8%.
3https://github.com/pytorch
9
Published as a conference paper at ICLR 2018
5.3 ATTACKING IMAGENET CLASSIFIERS
In this section we attack ImageNet classifiers with adversarial image perturbations (AIPs). We show
that the knowledge about the black box architecture family makes the attack more effective.
ADVERSARIAL IMAGE PERTURBATION (AIP)
AIPs are carefully crafted additive perturbations on the input image for the purpose of misleading
the target model to predict wrong labels (Goodfellow et al., 2015). Among variants of AIPs, we
use efficient and robust GAMAN (Oh et al., 2017). See appendix figure 7 for examples of AIPs; the
perturbation is nearly invisible.
TRANSFERABILITY OF AIPS Table 4: Transferability of ad-versarial examples within and
across families. We report
misclassification rates.
Target family
Gen S V B R D
Clean 38 32 28 30 29
S 64 49 45 39 35
V 62 96 96 57 52
B 50 85 95 47 44
R 64 72 78 87 77
D 58 63 70 76 90
Ens 70 93 93 75 80
Typical AIP algorithms require gradients from the target network,
which is not available for a black box. Mainly three approaches for
generating AIPs against black boxes have been proposed: (1) nu-
merical gradient, (2) avatar network, or (3) transferability. We show
that our metamodel strengthens the transferability based attack.
We hypothesize and empirically show that AIPs transfer better
within the architecture family than across. Using this property, we
first predict the family of the black box (e.g. ResNet), and then gen-
erate AIPs against a few instances in the family (e.g. ResNet101,
ResNet152). The generation of AIPs against multiple targets has
been proposed by Liu et al. (2017), but we are the first to system-
ically show that AIPs generalise better within a family when they
are generated against multiple instances from the same family.
We first verify our hypothesis that AIPs transfer better within a family. Within-family: we do a
leave-one-out cross validation – generate AIPs using all but one instances of the family and test
on the holdout. Not using the exact test black box, this gives a lower bound on the within-family
performance. Across-family: still leave out one random instance from the generating family to
match the generating set size with the within-family cases. We also include the use-all case (Ens):
generate AIPs with one network from each family.
See table 4 for the results. We report the misclassification rate, defined as 100−top-1 accuracy, on
100 random ImageNet validation images. We observe that the within-family performances dominate
the across-family ones (diagonal entries versus the others in each row); if the target black box family
is identified, one can generate more effective AIPs. Finally, trying to target all network (“Ens”) is
not as effective as focusing resources (diagonal entries).
METAMODEL ENABLES MORE EFFECTIVE ATTACKS
We empirically show that the reverse-engineering enables more effective attacks. We consider multi-
ple scenarios. “White box” means the target model is fully known, and the AIP is generated specif-
ically for this model. “Black box” means the exact target is unknown, but we make a distinction
when the family is known (“Family black box”).
Table 5: Black-box ImageNet classifier misclassi-
fication rates (MC) for different approaches.
Scenario Generating nets MC(%)
White box Single white box 100.0
Family black box GT family 86.2
Black box whitened Predicted family 85.7
Black box Multiple families 82.2
See table 5 for the misclassification rates (MC)
in different scenarios. When the target is fully
specified (white box), MC is 100%. When nei-
ther the exact target nor the family is known,
AIPs are generated against multiple families
(82.2%). When the reverse-engineering takes
place, and AIPs are generated over the pre-
dicted family, attacks become more effective
(85.7%). We almost reach the family-oracle
case (86.2%).
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5.4 DISCUSSION
Our metamodel can predict architecture families for ImageNet classifiers with high accuracy. We
additionally show that this reverse-engineering enables more focused attack on black-boxes.
6 CONCLUSION
We have presented first results on the inference of diverse neural network attributes from a sequence
of input-output queries. Our novel metamodel methods, kennen, can successfully predict attributes
related not only to the architecture but also to training hyperparameters (optimisation algorithm and
dataset) even in difficult scenarios (e.g. single-label output, or a distribution gap between the meta-
training models and the target black box). We have additionally shown in ImageNet experiments
that reverse-engineering a black box makes it more vulnerable to adversarial examples.
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APPENDIX
A MNIST-NETS STATISTICS
We show the statistics of MNIST-NETS, our dataset of MNIST classifiers, in table 6.
B MORE KENNEN-IO RESULTS
We complement the kennen-o results in the main paper (figure 4) with kennen-io results. See
figure 5. Similarly for kennen-o, kennen-io shows a diminishing return as the number of
training models and the number of queries increase. While the performance saturates with 1, 000
queries, it does not fully saturate with 5, 000 training samples.
C ON FINDING THE OPTIMAL SET OF QUERIES
kennen-o selects a random set of queries from MNIST validation set (§3.2). We measure the sen-
sitivity of kennen-o performance with respect to the choice of queries, and discuss the possibility
to optimise the set of queries.
With 1, 10, or 100 queries, we have trained kennen-o with 100 independent samples of query
sets. The mean and standard deviations are shown in figure 6. The sensitivity is greater for smaller
number of queries, but still minute (1.2 pp standard deviation).
Instead of solving the combinatorial problem of finding the optimal set of query inputs from a
dataset, we have proposed kennen-io that efficiently solves a continuous optimisation problem
to find a set of query inputs from the entire input space. We have compared kennen-io against
kennen-o with multiple query samples in figure 6. We observe that kennen-io is better than
kennen-o with all 100 query set samples at each level.
We remark that there exists a trade-off between detectability and effectiveness of exploration. While
kennen-io extracts information from target model more effectively, it increases the detectability
of attack by submitting out-of-domain inputs. If it is possible to optimise or sample the set of natural
queries from a dataset or distribution of natural inputs, it will be a strong attack; developing such a
method would be an interesting future work.
D T-SNE VISUALISATION OF METAMODEL INPUTS
We describe the detailed procedure for the metamodel input visualisation experiment (discussed in
§4.3). First, 1000 test-split (Random split) black-box models are collected. For each model, 100
query images are passed (sampled at random from MNIST validation set), resulting in 100 × 10
dimensional input data points. We have used t-SNE(van der Maaten & Hinton, Nov 2008) to embed
the data points onto the 2-dimensional plane. Each data point is coloured according to each attribute
class. The results for kennen-o and kennen-io are shown in figures 9 and 10. Since t-SNE is
sensitive to initialisation, we have run the embedding ten times with different random initialisations;
the qualitative observations are largely identical.
E VISUAL EXAMPLES OF AIPS
In this section, we show examples of AIPs. See figure 7 for the examples of AIPs and the perturbed
images. The perturbation is nearly invisible to human eyes. We have also generated AIPs with
respect to a diverse set of architecture families (S, V, B, R, D, SVBRD) at multiple L2 norm levels.
See figure 8; the same image results in a diverse set of patterns depending on the architecture family.
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Table 6: Distribution of attributes in MNIST-NETS, and attribute-wise classification performance
(on MNIST validation set). Observe that the attributes are evenly distributed and the corresponding
classification accuracies also do not correlate much with the attributes. We thus make sure that the
classification accuracy alone cannot be a strong cue for predicting attributes.
arch/act arch/drop arch/pool arch/ks arch/#conv arch/#fc
Tanh PReLU ReLU ELU Yes No Yes No 5 3 2 3 4 2 3 4
Ratio 24.8 24.9 25.3 25.1 49.8 50.3 49.9 50.2 50.3 49.7 34.0 33.4 32.7 33.1 33.5 33.4
max 99.4 99.4 99.5 99.4 99.5 99.4 99.4 99.5 99.5 99.4 99.4 99.4 99.5 99.4 99.4 99.5
median 98.6 98.7 98.7 98.7 98.7 98.6 98.7 98.5 98.7 98.6 98.6 98.7 98.7 98.7 98.6 98.6
mean 98.6 98.7 98.7 98.7 98.7 98.6 98.7 98.6 98.7 98.6 98.6 98.7 98.7 98.7 98.6 98.6
min 98.0 98.0 98.0 98.0 98.0 98.0 98.0 98.0 98.0 98.0 98.0 98.0 98.0 98.0 98.0 98.0
opt/alg opt/bs data/size
RMSprop ADAM SGD 64 128 256 all half quarter
Ratio 33.8 32.5 33.7 32.9 33.6 33.7 14.8 28.5 56.8
max 99.2 99.4 99.5 99.3 99.4 99.5 99.5 99.3 99.1
median 98.6 98.7 98.7 98.6 98.7 98.7 99.0 98.8 98.5
mean 98.6 98.7 98.7 98.6 98.7 98.6 98.9 98.8 98.5
min 98.0 98.0 98.0 98.0 98.0 98.0 98.0 98.0 98.0
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Figure 5: Performance of kennen-io with different number of queries (Left) and size of training
set (Right). The curves are linearly scaled per attribute such that random chance performs 0%, and
perfect predictor performs 100%.
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Figure 6: kennen-o/io performance at different number of queries. kennen-o is shown with
100 independent query samples per level (black dots) – the dots are spread horizontally for visuali-
sation purpose. Their mean (curve) and ±2 standard deviations (error bars) are also shown.
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Table 7: Details of ImageNet classifiers. We describe each family Squeezenet, VGG, VGG-
BatchNorm, ResNet, and DenseNet verbally, and show key model statistics for each member in
the family. We observe intra-family diversity (e.g. R) and inter-family similarity (e.g. between V
and B) in terms of the top-5 validation error and the number of trainable parameters.
S (2016) V (2014) B (2015) R (2015) D (2016)
Description Lightweight Conv layers followed VGG with batch Very deep convnet ResNet with denseconvnet by fc layers normalisation with residual connections residual connections
Members v1.0 v1.1 11 13 16 19 11 13 16 19 18 34 50 101 152 121 161 169 201
#layers 26 26 11 13 16 19 11 13 16 19 21 37 54 105 156 121 161 169 201
log10 #params 6.1 6.1 8.1 8.1 8.1 8.2 8.1 8.1 8.1 8.2 7.1 7.3 7.4 7.6 7.8 6.9 7.3 7.5 7.2
Top-1 error 41.9 41.8 31.0 30.1 28.4 27.6 29.6 28.5 26.6 25.8 30.2 26.7 23.9 22.6 21.7 25.4 24.0 22.8 22.4
Top-5 error 19.6 19.4 11.4 10.8 9.6 9.1 10.2 9.6 8.5 8.2 10.9 8.6 7.1 6.4 5.9 7.8 6.2 7.0 6.4
Original Perturbation Perturbed Original Perturbation Perturbed
Figure 7: AIP for an ImageNet classifier. The perturbations are generated at L2 = 1× 10−4.
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Figure 8: Adversarial perturbations for the same input image (top) generated with diverse ImageNet
classifier families (S, V, B, R, D, SVBRD) at different norm constraints. The perturbation images
are normalised at the maximal perturbation for visualisation. We observe diverse patterns across
classifier families within the same L2 ball.
16
Published as a conference paper at ICLR 2018
act
ReLU
ELU
PReLU
Tanh
drop
Yes
No
pool
Yes
No
ks
3
5
#conv
2
3
4
#fc
2
3
4
alg
SGD
ADAM
RMSprop
bs
256
128
64
split
All
Half0
Half1
Quarter0
Quarter1
Quarter2
Quarter3
Figure 9: Probability query output embedded into 2-D plane via t-SNE. The same embedding
is shown with different colour-coding for each attribute. These are the inputs to the kennen-o
metamodel.
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Figure 10: Probability query output embedded into 2-D plane via t-SNE. The same embedding
is shown with different colour-coding for each attribute. These are the inputs to the kennen-io
metamodel.
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Figure 11: Confusion matrices for kennen-o.
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Figure 12: Confusion matrices for kennen-io.
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